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DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL
THE NEW DANUBE COMMISSION:
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY IN
LAW AND POLITICSj-
STEPHEN GOROVE*
It has been over sixteen years since the Belgrade Conference
put the finishing touches on a Moscow-dictated regime for a great
European waterway which has been the traditional prototype of
international control: the Danube River.'
The Conference, the first of its kind at which the Kremlin, and
not the Western Powers, commanded the majority of votes, opened
an entirely new chapter in the history of the Danube. It repudiated
the century-old idea of internationalization - that is, freedom of
navigation on a basis of equality for riparians and nonriparians
alike which, with respect to the Danube, became an integral part
of the public law of Europe through a series of multilateral agree-
ments, including the treaties of Paris (1856), London (1871 and
1883), Berlin (1878), the Convention of Paris of 1921, and the peace
treaties of the First and Second World Wars - and substituted
the Soviet concept of free navigation which meant navigation under
the exclusive control of riparians, most of which were themselves
ruled by Russia. On a purely formal level, the Conference adopted
a Soviet-inspired Convention clearly reflective of the fundamental
changes which had occurred in the balance of power and patterns
of East European effective control to Russia's thorough advantage
in the wake of the Second World War.2
t The author is grateful to Martinus Nijhoff publishers for their permission
to reproduce these materials from his book, LAW AND POLITICS OF THE
DANUBE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY, published by Martinus Nijhoff, The
Hague, 1964.
* Professor of Law and International Relations, University of Denver College
of Law.
1 The very extensive literature dealing with the history of the Danube, em-
phasizing the politico-legal setting, includes the following treatises: BAICOI-
ANU, LE DANUBE (Paris, 1917); CHAMBERLAIN. THE DANUBE (Washington,
1918); DEMORGNY, LA QUESTION DU DANUBE (Paris, 1911); DUVERNOY, LE
REGIME INTERNATIONAL DU DANUBE (Paris, 1941); ENGELHARDT, DU REGIME
CONVENTIONNEL DES FLEUVES INTERNATIONAUX (Paris, 1879); HAJNAL, LE
DROIT Du DANUBE INTERNATIONAL (The Hague, 1929); KAECKENBECK, INTER-
NATIONAL RIVERS (London, 1920); MANCE, INTERNATIONAL RIVER AND
CANAL TRANSPORT (London, 1944); VAN EYSINGA, LES FLEUVES ET LES
CANAUX INTERNATIONAUX (Leyden, 1924).
2 For official American accounts of the Belgrade Conference, see the declara-
tions of Ambassador Cannon of Aug. 5, 7, 13 and 18, 19 DEP'T STATE BULL.
197-199, 219-223 (1948) ; see also statements by Walter A. Radius,
American delegate to the Conference, id. at 223-224, 283, 333. See
further U.S. Dep't of State, 1 DOCUMENTS AND STATE PAPERS 487-513 (1949).
For unofficial Soviet accounts, see statements by A. Y. Vishinsky, Chief
of the Soviet Delegation, at the Conference, in 3 SOVIET PRESS TRANSLATIONS
519-524 (1948) ; see also Soviet News (1948) ; July 31, pp. 1-2; Aug. 3, pp.
1-4; Aug. 4, pp. 1-2; Aug. 5, pp. 1-3; Aug. 6, pp. 1-3; Aug. 7, pp. 1-4; Aug.
9, pp. 1-2; Aug. 10, pp. 1-2; Aug. 11, pp. 1-2; Aug. 12, pp. 1-2; Aug. 13,
pp. 1-2; Aug. 16, pp. 1-2; Aug. 17, pp. 1-2; Aug. 20, pp. 1-4.
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Moscow and Washington looked in a very different light at the
Belgrade Convention. The Soviet Union characterized it as
document which fully met the interests of peace, democracy and
justice, guaranteeing for the first time genuine - and not merely
formal - equality of flags on the Danube. The views of the Western
Powers, on the other hand, were summed up in notes of protest
prompted by the first session in November 1949 of the new Danube
Commission, the principal organ brought into being by the Con-
vention. The American note, which was typical of the others, re-
affirmed the Western objections by stating that the new regime
was inadequate as a basis for freedom of navigation on the Danube
since it violated well-established concepts of international water-
ways, negated the provisions of the peace treaties of World War II,
denied immediate representation to Austria, made no provision for
eventual German participation, and disregarded the legitimate
interests of nonriparians with the purpose of sealing off the Dan-
ubian region from normal intercourse with the rest of the world to
the area's own direct disadvantage. 3
While Russia obviously did not need the Belgrade Convention
to place her in a dominant position in Southeastern Europe, she
felt that under the cover of this legal facade she could more effi-
ciently monopolize the river for her own purposes. Whereas the
initial clauses paid lip service to freedom of navigation and non-
discriminatory treatment, in reality these principles were entirely
abandoned. Instead of a strong and responsible organ, similar to
the International Commission established in 1921, with authority
to regulate and undertake development of the river, the Convention
had established a Danube Commission with extremely limited
powers. 4 Control of the river reverted to each of the riparian states
On the Belgrade Conference and Convention in general, see Bartos, La
conference du Danube a Beograd, 2 YOUGOsLAviE 25 (1948); Benoist, La
conference de Belgrade sur le statut du Danube, 20 LA NAVIGATION DU RHIN
411 (1948); BOiRov, DUNAISKAA KONFERENCIA (Moscow, 1948); Imbert,
Le regime juridique actuel du Danube, 55 REVUE GENERALE DU DROIT INTER-
NATIONAL PUBLIC 76 (1951); Kunz, The Danube Regime and the Belgrade
Conference, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 104 (1949); Radius, The Issues at Belgrade
Were Clearly Drawn, 19 DEP'T STATE BULL. 384 (1948); Sinclair, The
Danube Convention of 1948, 25 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 398 (1948) ; Seidl-
Hohenveldern, Die Belgrader Donaukonvention von 1948, 7 ARCHIV DES
VOLKERRECHTS 253 (1958); see also my article, Internationalization of the
Danube: A Lesson in History, 8 J. PUB. L. 125, 146 (1959).
For an English text of the Belgrade Convention, see 33 U.N.T.S. 197.
3 The note also stressed that the Convention was clearly designed to enable
the Soviet Union to maintain a monopoly on Danubian commerce. Hence
the United States could not recognize the authority of the Danube Com-
mission over any part of the river. The Soviet Government rejected the
Western protests and reiterated its view that the Danube Convention of
1948 eliminated the injustices of the past and established the jurisdiction
of the riparian states.
For the Soviet view, see 8 USSR INFORMATION BULL. 525 (1948). For the
Western notes and views and their Soviet rejection, consult 21 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 832 (1941); 3 CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 34-35
(1949); 4 id. at 37 (1950).
4 The meager quasi-legislative powers of the new Danube Commission -
which is made up of one representative of each Danubian state (presently:
Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, the U.S.S.R. and
Yugoslavia) - seem essentially limited to the unification of regulations
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in its own sector, or more precisely to the joint Danubian shipping
companies established shortly after the war by the Kremlin and
its satellites which were operated not for the mutual advantage of
the states concerned but for the primary benefit of the Soviet
Union.5 As a result, Stalin's Russia, through its political hegemony
over the majority of the riparians, had hopefully captured for its
own exclusive usea waterway vital to the control of East European
trade.
The brief history of the law and politics of the new Danube
Commission to date, just like that of the river itself in a much
wider developmental setting, has been a curious reflection of the
incessant operational push and pull of centrifugal and centripetal
forces, dividing and unifying men, nations and civilizations with
ever-changing intensity over the values and treasures of a great
governing river traffic and river inspection. The preponderance in Article
8 of the Belgrade Convention of such terms as "prepare," ".consult," "make
recommendations," "co-ordinate," and "publish" in connection with the Com-
mission's statutorily assigned functions appears sufficiently to reveal its
advisory character. In contradistinction, Articles 11-17 of the Paris Con-
vention of 1921, establishing the Definitive Statute of the Danube, gave
sweeping powers to the International Commission to draw up and supervise
a program of works for the improvement of navigation. For a text of the
Paris Convention, see Gt. Brit. T.S. (No. 16 of 1922).
Recent works discussing developments after the establishment of the
Danube Commission include: Carantino, Autour de la 5me Session de la
Conference Danubienne, 54 REVUE POLITIQUE ET PARLEMENTAIRE 169 (1952);
Cattell, The Politics of the Danube Commission under Soviet Control, 19
AM. SLAVIC AND EAST EUROPEAN REV. 380 (1960); FANDIKOV, MEZHDUNA-
RODNO-PRAVOVOI REZHIM DUNAIA (Moscow, 1955); Fillitz, Die Donauschiff-
ahrt von Einst zum Jetzt, 2 DONAURUM 164 (No. 3/4, 1957) ; Gschnitzer,
Die Donau, ein ungelostes europaisches Problem, 8 OSTERREICHISCHE MONATS-
HEFTE 385 (1952); Haeseler, Die internationale Rechtsregelung des Donau-
verkehrs, 2 OSTERREICHISCHE OST-HEFrE 251 (1960); LoGUNOV, SOVREMEN-
NYI MEZHDUNARODNO-PRAVOVOI REZHIM DUNAIA (Moscow, 1958); Miehsler,
Die Donau im Volkerrecht, 2 DONAURAUM 176 (No. 3/4, 1957); Paunovic,
SLOBODA PLOVIDBE I UPRAVA PRIBREZNIK DRZAVA NO DUNAVU (Belgrade, 1957) ;
Smith, The Danube, 4 YEARBOOK OF WORLD AFFAIRS 191 (1950); Stolte, Mos-
cow Regulates Traffic on the Danube, 7 INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF
U.S.S.R. BULL. 21 (1960) ; Toncic-Sorinj, Probleme der Internationalisierung
der Donau, 2 WISSENSCHAFTLICHER DIENST SUDOSTEUROPA 47 (1959); Wes-
sely, Probleme des Donauverkehrs unter dem neuen Statut, 30 WIRTSCHAFTS-
DIENST 28 (1950). Further articles on recent developments affecting the
Danube may also be found in issues of DONAURAUM, INTERNATIONALES
ARCHIV FUR VERKEHRSWESEN, REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, REVUE
DE LA NAVIGATION INTERIEURE ET RHENANE, SCHIFFAHRT UND WELTVERKEHR,
STROM UND SEE, SUDOSTEUROPA-JAHRBUCH, TRANSPORT, VERKEHR, VOLKS-
WIRT and ZEITSCHRIFT FUR BINNENSCHIFFAHRT.
5 The Russians have had long experience in running some of the Soviet
Republics through similar devices. See U.S. Congress, House Special Comm.
on Postwar Economic Policy and Planning, Eighth Report Pt. 2, 80th Cong.,
2d Sess. 41 (1948).
On Soviet trade practices and the operation of joint companies which
were established by agreements between the Soviet Union and its satellites,
see DEWAR, SOVIET TRADE WITH EASTERN EUROPE 1945-1949 (London, 1951);
FEJTO, HISTOIRE DES DEMOCRATIES POPULAIRES 435ff (Paris, 1952) ; SPULBER,
THE ECONOMIES OF COMMUNIST EASTERN EUROPE 166ff. (1957).
For the Soviet position, see Hungarian-Soviet Economic Review 20 (BUDA-
pest, 1952); 4 New Central European Observer 182 (London, 1951).




waterway. The progression of events since the establishment of the
latest Danube Commission, in and outside of its successive sessions,
may conveniently be grouped under three clearly discernible phases
marked by Soviet-Yugoslav dissension, rapprochement and coopera-
tion within the Commission, and externally by policies which have
substantially been affected by this internal setting.
DISSENSION
The Danube Commission has had a somewhat checkered ex-
istence, especially during the first years of its operation. It is the
irony of history that, just as the Soviet Union thought it had
secured, with the dutiful help of its satellites, exclusive control of
the Danube from below Linz to the Black Sea, it had to face up
to a new challenge, coming from a communist state - Tito's
Yugoslavia.
The Soviet-Yugoslav quarrel proved to be a disruptive influ-
ence which seriously interfered with Russia's hegemonistic plans
and cast its gloomy shadow on the forthcoming first session of the
Danube Commission (November 11-17, 1949)." While Moscow could
not entirely eliminate Belgrade from the Danube Commission
since Yugoslavia's geographic location placed her in a commanding
position over half of the Middle Danube and the important Iron
Gates sector, the Soviet Union regarded it as imperative that steps
be taken to prevent Yugoslavia from direct participation in the
management of the Commission. Thereby, Moscow hoped to tighten
its grip over the Danube.
From the very opening of the first session, continuous clashes
occurred between the representatives of the Cominform countries
and Yugoslavia. As a result, the latter found herself in a minority
of one, obstructed and frustrated at every turn and without any
influence on the Commission's decisions. The measures by which
the Soviet bloc achieved Tito's isolation may be traced to the three
vital issues which came up for discussion at the first session - the
election of officers, the rules of procedure, and the organization
of the Secretariat and Services of the Danube Commission.7
6 Manifestations of the communist split in matters of river navigation were
already apparent prior to the first session of the Danube Commission. In a
note dated October 15, 1949, Yugoslavia charged that, upon orders of the
Rumanian Government, the agencies of the Yugoslav State River Shipping
Company at Giurgiu and Braila, which had existed in Rumania continu-
ously since 1925, were forced to close and their officials were expelled. The
permanent Yugoslav delegates to the Provisional Committee of the Iron
Gates Administration were so hampered in their work that they had to
move from Rumanian to Yugoslavian territory. As pointed out in the note,
the Rumanian methods against Yugoslavian citizens and officials, which
included such actions as unlawful seizure, arrest and search, had never
before been applied among the riparian states in navigation along the
Danube. See Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (hereafter F.P.R.Y.),
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, WHITE BOOK 341 (Belgrade, 1951).
7 The proceedings of the Danube Commission are published in Russian and
French, the two official and working languages of the Commission. For the
French version, see PROCES-VERBAUX DE LA COMMISSION DU DANUBE, published
from 1949 to 1953 in Galatz and since 1954 in Budapest. (Hereafter cited
as PROC2S-VERBAUX, the occasionally quoted English phrases are my trans-
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Already, in regard to the first item, the delegates deliberately
ignored Yugoslavia and proceeded to elect, by voice vote,8 from a
single slate of candidates, a Rumanian President, a Czechoslovak
Vice-President and a Soviet Secretary for a three-year period. The
differences of opinion which, in the election of officers, were
characterized by a measure of Yugoslav self-restraint, 9 mushroomed
into substantial proportions in the course of ensuing debates over
procedural rules and administrative organization.
An analysis of the formalistic arguments reveals that under-
lying the legal facade was the relentless struggle for exclusive
Soviet control in the organization. The question was whether a
communist country that dared to challenge Stalin's authority could
have a role in the management of the Commission. For a time this
question was answered in the negative, and as a result, the Soviet
bloc rejected the Yugoslav proposals for the rotation of all services
and directing posts of the Commission and the recruitment of
personnel on the basis of equality.1 0 Instead, the Soviet-proposed l '
and adopted Rules of Procedure 12 and Statute relating to the
organization of the Secretariat and Services of the Danube Com-
mission vested complete administrative control in the Secretary
who was given full power to recruit his staff on the basis of "merit"
without regard to geographical distribution.13 The virtually un-
limited powers of the Secretary were assured by the fact that,
since he was a delegate, he was accountable only to his government
and not to the Commission.14 Furthermore, since none of the dele-
lations.) The full and true nature of the proceedings put out during the
Cominform-Yugoslav dispute has been subject to question. According to a
Yugoslav source, the minutes were disorderly and failed to record opposing
views. See 4 REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 13 (July 1, 1953).
8 The Yugoslav proposal for a secret ballot was rejected by a vote of 5 to 1.
I PROCES-VERBAUX 157, 164, 230.
9 Yugoslavia cast its vote against the election of the Rumanian President,
but abstained from voting in connection with the elections of the Vice-
President and the Secretary. Id. at 157ff.
10 The Yugoslav draft of the rules of procedure was rejected as a basis for
discussion by a vote of 5 to 1. The negative vote of Yugoslavia came to be
a recurrent pattern during the Tito-Cominform rift. For a discussion and
text of the Yugoslav draft, see id. at 164, 189, 230.
11 For texts of the Soviet draft of the rules of procedure and rejected Yugo-
slav amendments, see id. at 225, 244.
12 Under the Rules of Procedure, the President and the Vice-President exer-
cised only certain symbolic functions. Rule 12, for instance, provided that
correspondence with governments and international organizations was to
be signed by the President or Vice-President and the Secretary, whereas
correspondence with other authorities and institutions was to be signed
by the Secretary or a person authorized by him. A Yugoslav proposal, by
which the President would have directed the work of the Commission with
the aid of the Secretary, was rejected. For a discussion and text of the
Rules of Procedure, see id. at 214, 230.
13 See Rules 2, 4 and 5 of the Statute. For texts of the Statute, the Soviet
draft statute and a Yugoslav amendment which unsuccessfully proposed
the creation of a drafting committee composed of representatives of each
of the six member states, see I PROCES-VERBAUX 172, 219, 239, 248.
14 If the Secretary was temporarily unable to exercise his functions, he was
to be replaced by his deputy, that is, another member of his delegation; but
if the President and Vice-President were unable to exercise their functions,
VOL. XLI
NEW DANUBE COMMISSION
gates besides the Secretary could be present at headquarters while
the Commission was not in session, the road was cleared for the
Soviet Secretary to become the single-handed master of the organi-
zation.
In the face of Moscow's hegemonistic practices, the Yugoslav
representative rightly observed that the administrative organization
of the Commission was contrary to the procedure generally adopted
by international organizations and international law, under which
members of international bodies were entitled to permanent control
over the work of the body. 15 It was also contrary to the Danube
Convention since it transferred fundamental rights of the Com-
mission, through the office of the virtually omnipotent Secretary-
delegate, to one single member-state.16 Stalin's Russia, naturally,
saw no foundation in the Yugoslav charges and the satellites echoed
Moscow's view that the rules adopted by the Soviet majority corre-
sponded to genuinely democratic principles."
Despite the rebuffs she had received, Yugoslavia attended the
second session of the Commission (March 23-27, 1950) if for no
other reason than to protest the fact that important documents,
such as the plan of work and budget, had been made available to
the Yugoslav delegation barely before the commencement of the
meeting and that all her requests for information from the Com-
mission had gone unanswered. 8 Russia, in turn, obliquely rebuked
Yugoslavia's efforts to loosen Soviet control and set the keynote
for the Commission's work by accusing the West of attempted
interference and by reiterating her slogans that the Danube- be-
longed to the Danubian countries and that it would never flow
toward the West.' 9 On this warning, the Commission then pro-
ceeded to pass the Soviet-supported proposals with the usual
disregard for Yugoslavia's views.
20
By the time the third session (December 10-15, 1950) opened,
the Secretary, not alternates in their delegations, had to take over. See
Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure.
15 While the rejected Yugoslav draft allowed each member to demand infor-
mation regarding the work of the Commissim at any time, the adopted
Rules of Procedure had no such provision. Similarly, the latter made no
provision for standing subcommittees with equal representation, but only
for ad hoc working groups to be appointed by the Commission or, in case
of urgency, by the President and the Secretary "from among its members."
See Rule 13 of the Rules of Procedure and the discussion of it, I PROCES-
VERBAUX 163, 183, 215, 231.
16 Id. at 189-191.
17 Id. at 195ff.
18 I1 id. at 131, 168, 199.
19 Id. at 118.
20 Among the items discussed were the budget and the importance of improve-
ment of navigation in the Gabcikovo-Gonyu sector. In regard to the latter,
the Commission charged its Services to determine the extent of hydrotech-
nical works which were necessary. The Commission also decided to call
upon the Secretary to determine the fate of the property of the International
Danube Commission and authorized him to take possession of such property
and reclaim it, if necessary. A Yugoslav proposal for an equal distribution
of jobs in the organization's apparatus among the members, taking into
consideration the importance of the job, was defeated. See id. at 131, 147,
184, 189, 190.
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Yugoslavia made no bones about its sweeping condemnation of
Soviet actions. In the bluntest and most direct language ever used
in the Commission, the Yugoslav delegate charged that the Rules
of Procedure and Statute adopted by the Soviet-led majority were
contrary to Vishinsky's statement at Belgrade and violated the
Danube Convention which assured free navigation with due re-
gard to the sovereign rights of the Danubian states. "When we
pass from words to deeds," he went on, "we could observe that
words of the Soviet representative state one thing and in reality
they result in something else." He repeated one of his earlier
charges that the Commission's essential competence had been con-
ferred upon the Secretary, a Soviet delegate, who was not subject
to the control of the Commission; at the same time, the participa-
tion and influence of the other delegates were reduced to a mini-
mum. He added that Yugoslavia did not even succeed in realizing
that minimum. In lieu of the formal work of the Commission,
Yugoslavia demanded assurances for a "real, equal and permanent
participation by all delegates. '21 Not only were there no assurances
forthcoming, but the Soviet delegate added oil to the fire by accus-
ing Yugoslavia of interfering with free navigation, placing unwar-
ranted controls over foreign ships and forbidding them the use of
some Yugoslav ports.
2 2
The negative attitude of the Soviet-dominated Commission
toward Yugoslavia's demand for equal participation in its control,
as well as the establishment over Yugoslav objection of a special
fluvial administration along the Rajka-Gonyu sector 23 and the fact
that Yugoslavia was excluded from all sixteen major posts,
2
clearly showed that Russia was doing her best to turn the Danube,
the biggest European international waterway, into a Russian river.
Yugoslavia, on her part, conscious of her own importance as a
riparian, as well as of likely Western support in case of an armed
conflict with Russia, stood up for her rights, even though at the
conference table she seemed to be fighting - during that time
at any rate - a losing battle against the Soviet bloc.
It was at the fourth session (May 23-June 5, 1951) that the
Moscow-Belgrade rift in the Commission reached its climax. For
quite some time relations between the two countries had been
.steadily deteriorating. 25 Diplomatic relations between the Comin-
21 111 id. at 219, 235.
22Id. at 224.
23 Yugoslavia objected to the establishment, in violation of the express pro-
visions of the Convention and without prior discussion, of a special river
administration over the Rajka-Gonyu sector along the Czechoslovak-Hun-
garian border, which was twice as large as the Gapcikovo-Gonyu sector
for which administration was provided in the Convention. Yugoslavia
charged that, by setting up this administration, the Commission was exceed-
ing its authority and competence. Id. at 247-248, 253.
24 Yugoslavia was not only excluded from the posts of President, Vice-Presi-
dent and Secretary, but also from 13 other directing posts in the Secretariat
and Services of the Commission. She was only offered the minor posts of
an assistant controller, an engineer, a lawyer and a statistician. Id. at 221-
222; VII id. at 290, 303, 344ff.
25 Perhaps the most intimidating acts were the military maneuvers held by the
Soviets in the spring of 1950 in the Austrian sector of the waterway. Yugo-
Qlavia stronalv objected to these war exercises since they made navigation
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form countries and Yugoslavia had been broken. Harrassments of
Yugoslav officials and citizens in Soviet bloc countries were notably
increasing. For a while it appeared that the only thing which pre-
vented a complete embargo on Yugoslav shipping by the Comin-
form nations was the fear of Yugoslavia's retaliation, which could
have resulted in the latter's closing up of essential fluvial traffic
between the Middle and the Lower Danube.
It was in this climate of continuously worsening Soviet-Yugo-
slav relations that the Danube Commission gathered for its ominous
fourth session. While the Soviet Union had paid lip service to the
principles of the Belgrade Convention many times beforehand, at
this session it became increasingly evident that she was now openly
trying to revise it to suit her own imperialistic designs. The key
agenda item used for this purpose was a seemingly innocuous
Soviet-inspired draft of basic rules governing navigation on the
Danube.
26
The main provisions of the proposal, which were eventually
adopted by the Commission, related to the rafting of timber, the
granting of absolute priority of passage to vessels navigating the
Danube, and the right of states to investigate the causes of damage,
collision and other losses caused by foreign vessels in their terri-
torial waters.
2 7
In regard to the first, the draft prohibited the free rafting of
timber presumably on the grounds that it was obsolete and danger-
ous to shipping. Actually, rafts were floated along the banks of the
Danube and constituted little barrier to navigation. Thus it was
more likely that the provision was motivated by Russia's desire to
curtail Yugoslavia's transportation of timber by raft on the river
and to capture the lucrative transport of wood for her own ships
and the ships of the joint shipping companies that she controlled in
the satellite states.
28
The second major provision of the draft proposed to grant
absolute priority of passage to vessels navigating either upstream
or downstream on the Danube over boats entering the main channel
from its tributaries. Yugoslavia strongly opposed such priority of
international over internal traffic since it was to be given irrespec-
virtually impossible and as such were in violation of Articles 1 and 2 of
the Belgrade Convention which guaranteed free and open navigation on
the Danube. Yugoslavia also noted that, although Article 26 of the Con-
vention provided for non-discrimination in customs, health and police pro-
cedures, the Russian military authorities were unduly delaying Yugoslav
vessels passing through the Soviet sector of the Danube in Austria. The
Russian reply to these allegations simply stated that the Soviet commandants
had every right to proceed as they did since they acted in their capacity
ns occupation authorities. For texts of Yugoslavia's protest notes of June
8 and June 13, 1950, and the Soviet reply of August 22, 1950, as well as
subsequent exchanges, see F.P.R.Y., Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op. cit.
supra note 6, at 336, 337, 358.
20 The basic regulations were discussed by a working group prior to the fourth
session of the Commission. For texts of the working group's report and the
draft of basic regulations governing navigation on the Danube, see IV
PROCES-VERBAUX 291, 346.
27 For a text of the adopted Basic Regulations Governing Navigation on the
Danube, see id. at 305.'
28 Id. at 308.
1964
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tive of whether it was necessary or not, whether the vessel was
moving upstream or downstream, that is, whether the boat was
in an easier or a harder situation than the vessel coming from a
tributary. Yugoslavia felt that the provision was directed primarily
against her since there were several tributaries on her territory
constantly used by her vessels.
29
The provision which precipitated the Yugoslav walk-out pur-
ported to deprive the riparian states of the right to investigate the
causes of damage, collision, and other losses occasioned by foreign
vessels in their territorial waters. Yugoslav opposition to this pro-
posal stemmed not so much from such theoretical considerations
that the provision was contrary to the well-established principle of
locus regit actum and violated the sovereign rights of the riparian
states, but mainly from the realization of the fact that, by virtue
of the stipulation, ships could freely anchor in the territorial waters
of a riparian for the purposes of sabotage, infiltration, and similar
activities without any fear of inspection. The provision, if accepted
by Belgrade, would in fact have empowered the Soviet authorities
to conduct investigations in Yugoslavia. At the same time, no state
would have had an occasion to conduct an inquiry on Soviet terri-
tory since Russia holds only a relatively small channel on the left
bank of the Danube of which at that time -she had the exclusive
use.30
The provision concerning the investigation of damage showed
most clearly that the draft regulations were intended to give in-
creased navigation rights to Russia, while imposing maximum lia-
bilities on the other riparian states. Belgrade's reaction to the
draft proposals, according to a Yugoslav source, was the same as
Serbia's had been in 1914 when she risked war rather than allow
foreign investigators on her territory.8 1 Yugoslavia charged that,
by the mechanical voting on the rules of navigation and the auto-
matic rejection of her "justified" amendments, she was systematic-
ally placed before an accomplished fact. The other riparians'
"brutal" discrimination against her, and the imposition of obliga-
tions contradicting the letter and spirit of the Convention of 1948,
constituted an "open revision" of the same and rendered her partici-
•pation in the Commission's work impossible.8 2 Thus, on June 2,
1951, the Yugoslav delegation walked out of the meeting after
fruitless attempts to prevent the adoption of new rules of naviga-
tion that purported to give the Soviet Union complete control of the
river from Linz to the Black Sea. 3 Subsequently, Yugoslavia in-
formed the Commission that it would thereafter establish its own
rules of navigation on the Danube and considered the Soviet-im-
posed rules to be null and void.
34
29 Id. at 308ff.
30 Id. at 361ff.
31 3 RVVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 10 (1952).
32 IV PROCES-VERBAUX 218, 262.
3 The new regulations were to serve as a guide for the drafting of national
laws governing navigation on the Danube. Id. at 262, 304.
34 The Yugoslav note of August 23, 1951, contended that the Basic Regula-
tions were contrary to the Danube Convention of 1948 insofar as they gave
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Insofar as Yugoslavia was concerned, the fourth session of the
Danube Commission demonstrated that the Soviet Union had no
desire to regulate the question of navigation on the Danube, but
only intended to apply measures to further its policy of domina-
tion. Moscow, in turn, reacted with the usual technique of counter-
accusation, charging that the Yugoslav walk-out had been decided
prior to the commencement of the session under the dictates of
American imperialistic circles who had hoped to interfere with the
normal work of the Commission.35 Actually, while the Western
Powers undoubtedly favored liberalization within the Danube Com-
mission, there is no evidence to indicate that the Yugoslav walk-
out was carried out after prior consultation with Washington or
that it was prompted by American pressure on Yugoslavia.
It was not to the benefit of the Soviet Union, however, to have
Yugoslavia permanently withdraw from the Commission. Her
geographical position was much too strategic for this and further
antagonism might have led to a complete disruption of the already
substantially reduced river traffic and might have driven her into
closer ties with the West. Last, but not least, the existing interna-
tional situation in the wake of the Korean conflict also seemed to
require a policy of self-restraint, so long as such policy did not
jeopardize Soviet authority within the Danube Commission. Ac-
cordingly, the Kremlin regarded it as necessary to secure at least
a formal modus vivendi with Tito. To this Yugoslavia had no ob-
jection since her complete withdrawal from the Commission would
have been of little, if any, benefit. Moreover, Yugoslavia had sup-
ported the Convention of 1948 and objected solely to the Soviet
usurpation of authority in violation of the principle of equality.
Thus, at the fifth session (December 10-19, 1951), Yugoslavia was
in attendance.
The somewhat conciliatory attitude of the Soviet bloc was not
only reflected in the general tone of the discussions but in the ab-
sence of the usual political debates. The matter of procedure for
investigating accidents on the Danube was again brought up at this
session. 6 The Soviet Union, in an attempt to avoid another Yugo-
slav walk-out, had suggested a modification of the Unified Regula-
tions adopted at the previous session, so that riparian states could
conduct investigations at least in those cases where they suffered
damages through the accident. While the new Soviet proposal met
some of the Yugoslav objections,37 it was still unacceptable to Yu-
the Soviet Union control over the river in violation of the sovereign rights
of the riparian countries. 5 CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
26 (1951).
35 Carantino, Autour de la 5me Session de la Conference Danubienne, 54 REVUE
POLITIQUE ET PARLEMENTAIRE 169, 174 (1952).
36 It came up in connection with the discussion of the draft regulations on
river supervision prepared by the Soviet-controlled Secretariat. For texts
of the draft and proposed amendments, see V PROCES-VERBAUX 369.
37 Yugoslavia, for instance, objected to a proposal which would have limited
the riparian country's right to investigate accidents to such cases where"material damage" occurred, pointing out that damage could arise as a
result of criminal action without simultaneous material losses being suf-
fered by the country in question. The eventually adopted regulations (Arts.
17 and 18) made no reference to "material damage" but simply to "damage."
Id. at 279ff., 357ff.
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goslavia because of its failure to make it clear that the criterion of
damage, that is whether damage had been caused or not, was to
be determined by the laws of the state where the damage occur-
red. 8 Yugoslavia feared that without such clarification the ques-
tion of damage was likely to be decided by the Soviet majority in
the Danube Commission. Finally, Moscow's formula was put
through over opposition by the Yugoslav delegate who reserved his
country's right to recognize the Commission's decisions pertaining
to the policing of the river only insofar as they were in accordance
with Yugoslavia's domestic- laws.
8 9
In regard to another basic question, the budget, the Yugoslav
representative rebuked the satellites for not taking a stand of their
own, even in such an important matter as the finances of the Com-
mission. Yugoslavia opposed the budget not only because it was
decided by a simple vote, but more importantly because, in Bel-
grade's view, the working methods in the Commission were not re-
flective of the type of relations which should have prevailed among
equal countries. In addition, Yugoslavia was not overly desirous of
lending its financial support to projects directed by Russia.40
While Yugoslav policy seemed to have reaped no immediate
tangible benefits at the fifth session of the Commission, it was felt
that the Kremlin would eventually have to come to grips with the
hard facts of geography, economics, and power politics. The lessen-
ing of the sharpness of the over-all tone of the discussions and the
modifications, though admittedly minor, of the formerly intransi-
gent Soviet position, must have given some gratification to Yugo-
slav policy-makers. In addition, there were other slightly encourag-
ing straws in the wind. During the period immediately following
the fifth session, certain events took place which once more clearly
indicated the great economic significance of the Danube as a car-
rier of trade. The Russians, who were seriously handicapped by a
shortage of suitable vessels in the Austrian sector under their con-
trol, began to issue .permits allowing Austrian ships 'to sail down
into the Soviet zone of Austria and up to the Hungarian border.4 1
It was in this climate of somewhat lessening tensions that Yugo-
slavia decided to submit to the sixth session (June 23-July 2, 1952)
a draft for the revision of the Rules of Procedure and the Statute
relating to the organization of the Secretariat and Services of the
Commission, with a view toward making it more representative. 42
In the past, such a proposal would have been rejected outright by
the Commission, but now the Soviet-controlled majority referred it
for study to a Special Committee.43 It soon became obvious, how-
3 A Yugoslav amendment embodying such clarification was defeated by the
usual 5 to 1 vote. Id. at 279, 372.
39 The Regulations on River Supervision on the Danube were adopted by a
vote of 5 to 1. Id. at 282, 356-357.
40 Id. at 273, 276.
41 New York Times, June 15, 1952, p. 5, col. 2. Certain economic restrictions
governing the Danube, however, continued to remain in effect. See Gazette
of the Allied Commission for Austria 10, 19 (April 1953).
42VI PROCES-VERBAUX 389ff., 407.
43 Id. at 382.
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ever, that this was more of a delaying tactic than a decision prompt-
ed by the complexity of the subject matter. Thus, when Yugoslavia
wished to have its proposal included in the agenda of the seventh
session (December 15-26, 1952), it met with resolute opposition from
the Soviet bloc. 44 As this session wore on, it became increasingly ap-
parent that Soviet-Yugoslav relations were once again characterized
by the negative aspects which had manifested themselves in earlier
sessions. Serious disagreements were evident in relation to the
Secretariat's report on the Commission's work,43 the budget 46 and
the election of officers.47 The disagreements reached their peak in
Rumania's charges against the alleged unilateral acts of Yugoslav
authorities at the Iron Gates sector 48 and in Yugoslav counter-
44 In the face of this opposition, the Yugoslav delegate bitterly remarked
that the Danube Commission during its short-lived existence had not been
an organization of all Danubian countries, but one which served the pur-
poses of a single member of the Commission. He felt that the majority
preferred to postpone discussion of the Yugoslav draft for an indefinite
period since it was difficult openly to oppose the democratic principles and,
especially, the principle of peaceful collaboration among the Danubian
countries, upon which the proposal was based. VII id. at 276, 278.
45 In connection with the Secretariat's report on the Commission's accomplish-
ments, the Yugoslav representative pointed out that the Secretariat had
no right to cc-nment on or defend the rules of procedure as it did in the
report since it knew that not all the members of the Commission agreed
with the statement that the Rules of Procedure had "by and large proved
themselves just." Id. at 288, 465.
46 In 1950 Yugoslavia paid only an advance sum of 176,700 rubles out of its
allotted budgetary share of 540,000 rubles. With the additional assessments
of 100,000 and 150,000 rubles for 1951 and 1952 respectively, which Yugo-
slavia refused to pay, the total Yugoslav debt at the time of the seventh
session (end of 1952) amounted to 613,300 rubles. Yugoslavia regarded
these financial obligations as too excessive and, as in the course of the
fifth session, she sought again to justify her nonpayment on the ground
that her rights and obligations were inseparable. She was willing to settle
the matter of finances as soon as the other members of the Commission
changed their attitude toward her justified demand for equal participation
in the management of the Commission. The position of the Soviet bloc
toward Yugoslavia's nonpayment was summed up by the Hungarian delegate
who stated that the Yugoslav representative was haunted by the phantom
of discrimination against his country. Subsequently the Commission found
Belgrade's explanation unsatisfactory and declared that the nonpayment
of her dues constituted a violation of the Convention of 1948. Id. at 290,
293, 327, 329, 482, 498.
47 Yugoslavia accused the Soviet bloc of open discrimination against her since
she was offered only four minor posts. The accusation, however, did not
prevent the Commission from once more ignoring Yugoslavia and electing
a Soviet Secretary, a Rumanian President and a Hungarian Vice-President.
Id. at 290, 303, 344ff.
48 The Commission considered a controversial motion by Rumania to censure
Yugoslavia for the "unilateral" measures it took in the Iron Gates sector.
On October 5, 1945, Rumania and Yugoslavia had set up a Provisional Com-
mittee for the joint administration of the Iron Gates sector of the river
which forms a boundary between the two countries. The Committee had
agreed to pay Yugoslavia 70,000 Swiss francs a year in return for the use
of locomotive traction installations much the same way as when the old
International Commission was in charge. In October, 1952, however, Yugo-
slavia took over the traction facilities as a retaliation against Rumania's
failure to pay the agreed annual rent and declared that when a party to
a contract failed to meet its obligations, it relinquished its right to demand
fulfillment of the contract from the other party. Despite these Yugoslav
representations, the Commission condemned the "unilateral" and "illegal"
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charges of alleged Rumanian obstruction of navigation on the
Danube.49 At one point the Yugoslav representative sharply re-
marked that he knew of no international organization - apart from
the Danube Commission - where the interests and rights of the
members had been so "brutally" violated. 50
RAPPROCHEMENT
The first sign of a notable change in the relation between Yugo-
slavia and the Soviet bloc came shortly after Stalin's death with the
announcement that, on May 30, 1953, an agreement had been signed
between Yugoslavia and Rumania on the joint control and admin-
istration of the Iron Gates sector.51 While the agreement related
primarily to technical problems, it was characteristically looked
upon as a sign of Russian good will. Actually, the agreement was
of mutual benefit inasmuch as it put an end to a dispute that was
more of a nuisance than a political asset.
Following the signature of the Yugoslav-Rumanian agreement,
expectations were high in the West that the Special Committee,
which was still considering the Yugoslav draft for procedural and
organizational reforms, would also reflect a more conciliatory at-
titude. The expectation was heightened by the fact that, less than a
month before the Special Committee was scheduled to meet, Austria
and Hungary had reached an agreement providing for the resump-
tion and regulation of Danubian traffic between the two countries.52
The signing of the Yugoslav-Rumanian and Austro-Hungarian
agreements were steps in the direction of normalizing navigation on
the Danube and reducing the tension that existed between Yugo-
slavia and the Soviet bloc. The Yugoslav permission in June 1953,
allowing the U.S.S.R. to move its warships from Vienna to the Black
Sea - the first such move since Belgrade's quarrel with Moscow -
was a concrete manifestation of this trend.5
In the substantially improved atmosphere of the eighth session
(June 26-July 3, 1953), the Yugoslav proposals were finally brought
out of the Special Committee. Whereas the basic demand to remove
control from the hands of the Soviet Secretary was not met, signifi-
cant changes were introduced on the recommendation of the com-
mittee.54 The very same states which had previously denounced the
actions of Yugoslav authorities and demanded that Belgrade refrain from
interfering with normal navigation 'on the river and respect the provisions
of the Danube Convention. Id. at 356, 367, 388, 416, 503; F.P.R.Y., Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, op. cit., supra, note 6 at 341.
49 The Commission took no action on the Yugoslav charge that Rumania was
obstructing navigation on the Danube. VII PROCES-VERBAUX 423.
50 Id. at 303.
51 Under the agreement, a permanent administrative body, composed equally
of Yugoslavs and Rumanians, was set up for the narrow gorge between
the two countries through which the Danube shipping must be towed by
land locomotive or barge. The administration has its own budget and estab-
lishes its own rules of procedure. New York Times, May 15, 1953, p. 1,
col. 1; June 1, 1953, p. 5, col. 5.
52 The Austro-Hungarian agreement was signed in Budapest on May 15, 1953.
KEESING, CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES 13086 (August 15-22, 1953).
53 Ibid.
54 The Special Committee met in Bucharest from June 8-24, 1953. For a text
of the Special Committee's recommendations, see VIII PROCES-VERBAUX 365.
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Yugoslav proposal, now suddenly were full of praise for the Soviet-
supported changes which reproduced many ideas advanced in the
Yugoslav draft.55 Despite the substantial concessions, Yugoslavia
voted against the new rules since she felt that without a rotation
of posts the Secretary would continue to maintain his dominant
position and hence there would be no genuine equality in the Com-
mission.5 6
While the changes introduced in the administrative structure
of the Danube Commission did not fully meet with Yugoslav ap-
proval, nonetheless they must be regarded as a significant move
toward the improvement of Soviet-Yugoslav relations which were
soon thereafter normalized by the re-establishment of diplomatic
representation between the two countries. As a further conciliatory
gesture, the Commission also decided to charge its President and
Secretary with the preparation of a draft statute relating to the
organization of the Secretariat and the Services of the Commission,
taking into consideration comments from all member states.5
7
Although the eighth session of the Danube Commision revealed
a more conciliatory attitude on the part of the Soviet Union toward
Yugoslavia, it was hardly indicative of the major changes that
were to take place at the ninth session (December 9-17, 1953). Here,
for the first time since the creation of the Commission, all decisions
were made unanimously and on the basis of recognizing Yugo-
slavia's right to equal participation in the administrative manage-
ment of Danubian navigation. Interestingly enough, the Soviet
representative was the one who proposed to modify Article 7 of the
Rules of Procedure, which had been adopted only at the previous
session, to the effect that in filling the three major posts (Secre-
tary, President, Vice-President) the Commission should give due
regard to the principle of rotation and should choose from among
representatives of states which during the preceding three years
had not held any eligible posts. He added that he was motivated by
the desire for all countries to participate actively in the work of the
Commission.58 The Soviet proposal constituted a major concession
55 For a text of the Yugoslav draft, see VI id. at 389. A brief appraisal of
the draft may be found in 4 REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 13 (1953).
56 VIII PROCES-VERBAUX 259, 267, 271.
The revised rules provided for the election of the Commission's Presi-
dent, Vice-President and Secretary by secret ballot and simple majority vote
and stipulated that, in proposing candidates for these three posts, the
Commission be led by the consideration that a representative of each state
have the opportunity to occupy one of these posts at least once during
"three periods of three years" (Rules 6 and 7). Under the new rules, the
Secretary, jointly with the President, was empowered to exercise general
direction over the affairs of the Commission, oversee and regulate the work
of the Secretariat and the Services and sign the proceedings in the name
of the Commission (Rules 8 and 10). The Secretariat and the Services were
to be headed by a Director who was personally responsible for his work
to the Commission (Rule 38). All personnel of the Commission were to be
recruited, insofar as possible on the basis of equality considering the
number and importance of the positions, from among the citizens of the
member states which the latter placed at the disposal of the Commission
(Rule 40). Id. at 377ff., 381ff.
57 Id. at 364.
58 IX id. at 205, 207, 257.
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to Yugoslavia which had long championed the idea of full equality.
Following the unanimous acceptance of the Russian proposal, new
elections were held and, as a result, for the first time Yugoslavia
received the important post of Secretary. 59 The Commission's sub-
sequent adoption of new rules relating to the organization of the
Secretariat and -Services of the Commission" as well as the ap-
proval of another- long-standing Yugoslav proposal to move the
headquarters of the organization from Galatz to Budapest were
appropriate follow-ups to Moscow's policy of conciliation.6 1 The
liberalization of the internal working methods and rules of the
Danube Commission was not only of benefit to Yugoslavia but to
the satellite states as well, not so much in the sense of permitting
them any independent course of action but in the greater flexibility
that they seem to have acquired in advancing their own proposals.
The reasons for the radical and complete reversal of Moscow's
attitude toward Belgrade must be sought in both external and do-
mestic factors influencing Soviet policy. First, the ninth session took
place at a time when the impact of the Graeco-Turkish-Yugoslav
alignment seems to have been increasingly felt, especially due to
the uneasiness of the Soviet position which continued for some time
after Stalin's death. Second, the Soviet Union had more and more
come to realize the great economic significance of the Danube which
could be utilized fully only by a policy of accommodation with
Yugoslavia in view of the latter's key position. Third, the change in
Moscow's policy could also have been prompted by a desire to en-
hance the reputation of the Danube Commission as an international
organization, a reputation which reached its lowest ebb during the
era of Stalinist arbitrariness.
The Soviet-Yugoslav reconciliation which took place in the
course of the ninth session seemed to be part of a broader policy of
relaxation of Soviet intransigence as indicated by a series of bila-
teral agreements between the riparian states,62 a number of Soviet
59 At the same time, a Hungarian President and a Bulgarian Vice-President
were also elected. Id. at 211.
60 Under the new rules relating to the organization of the Secretariat and
Services of the Danube Commission, the number of administrative sections
in these organs was reduced from eleven to six. The Director, the two
assistant-directors and the chiefs of sections of the Secretariat and Services
were to be appointed by the Commission. Vacant posts were to be filled by
the President and Secretary of the Commission in consultation with the
Director, bearing in mind the requirement, already incorporated in Rule
40 of the Rules of Procedure by the eighth session, to effect a fair distri-
bution of appointments among all member countries from the viewpoint of
number and importance of the posts. Id. at 193, 252.
61 While earlier Yugoslav proposals had been voted down, at the ninth session,
upon motion of the Hungarian representative, the Commission unanimously
decided to move the headquarters from Galatz to the more centrally located
Budapest. Id. at 199, 204, 256.
62Apart from the Austro-Hungarian agreement already mentioned, other
agreements were concluded with Austria by Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia,
Bulgaria and Rumania in 1953, 1954 and 1955. They were essentially simi-
lar, providing for the reciprocal use of the river and harbor facilities and
the mutual establishment of shipping and import agencies in the territories
of the contracting parties. Austria also concluded a Treaty of Trade and
Navigation on October 17, 1955, with the U.S.S.R. and the whole series was
culminated on June 14, 1957, when agreement was reached between the
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concessions to the satellites63 and the signing of the Austrian State
Treaty 64 which considerably improved Austria's shipping prospects.
COOPERATION
The Commission's sessions following the spectacular reversal
of Soviet policy toward Belgrade reflected a spirit of compromise
and a desire for cooperation between the Soviet bloc and Yugo-
slavia.65 The recognized need for stabilization of the internal or-
ganization of the Commission's apparatus made it necessary that
appropriate conditions for normalization be created. In line with
this policy, the Soviet bloc decided to annul Yugoslavia's debt of
613,300 rubles which the latter owed to the Commission for the
years 1950, 1951 and 1952 on its budgetary assessments.6 In addi-
tion, the complete change in the Commission's attitude was also ap-
parent from the fact that the proceedings were swift, unanimous
Soviet Union and Austria concerning the settlement of technical and com-
mercial questions relating to navigation on the Danube. The latter agree-
ment provided for most-favored-nation treatment in all matters relating
to merchant shipping on the Danube. West Germany also entered into
agreements with the communist states (e.g., with Russia on April 25, 1958),
however, in her case, they were mostly concluded as part of general trade
agreements. See 240 U.N.T.S. 289 (1956) ; 285 id. 169 (1958) ; 362 id. 119
(1959) ; 346 id. 71 (1959) ; The Times (London), November 12, 1954, p. 6;
May 16, 1955, p. 6; July 4, 1955, p. 8.
Various bilateral accords were also signed between the satellite states
themselves. The most important was the Agreement of December 5, 1953, be-
tween the Soviet Union and Rumania which, in conformity with Article 20 of
the Danube Convention, provided for the establishment of a Special Fluvial
Administration to effectuate hydro-technical works and regulate naviga-
tion on the Lower Danube from the mouth of the Sulina Channel to Braila.
The Administration began to function in July 1954 and was, by the sub-
sequent Agreement of July 18, 1957, turned over by Russia to Rumania.
See XI PROCES-VERBAUX 175; XIII id. at 331; LOGUNOV, SOVREMENNYI
MEZHDUNARODNO-PRAVOVOI REZHIM DUNAIA 104 (Moscow 1958). For another
agreement on Danubian navigation, concluded between Yugoslavia and Bul-
garia on April 19, 1957, see 349 U.N.T.S. 3 (1960).
63 For example, the ships of both West Germany and France were given per-
mission to travel over the Soviet-occupied section of the Danube prior to the
conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty. Other concessions included the
liquidation of the joint navigation companies through a series of agree-
ments between the satellite states and the Soviet Union which turned over
its shares to the national shipping companies. See, for instance, the Agree-
ment between the Soviet Union and Hungary concerning the transfer and
sale to Hungary of Soviet shares in Hungarian-Soviet joint-stock com-
panies, signed on November 6, 1954, in Moscow. VNESHNIAIA TORGOVLIA 43
(No. 12, 1954) ; New York Times, April 29, 1955, p. 1.
61 Article 31 of the Austrian State Treaty made navigation on the Danube
free and open to all nations.
65 At the tenth (June 8-15, 1954), eleventh (December 8-15, 1954) and twelfth
(June 8-13, 1955) sessions, the Hungarian President praised the full and
good collaboration among all members of the Commission and referred to
the improved international climate which created an atmosphere favorable
to the improvement of navigation conditions. Despite the announced co-
operation, it was reported that in 1956 another permanent Danube Com-
mission was set up by the Soviet-controlled Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance to draft measures for the increased utilization of the Danube
for power, irrigation and navigation. Belgrade viewed this Commission
as a rival to the official Danube Commission. X PROCES-VERBAUX 223; XI
id. at 166; XII id. at 119; New York Times, September 2, 1956, p. 26.
66 VII PROCES-VERBAUX 482; XII id. at 150.
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agreements were reached with little discussion, 67 political debates
were lacking and differences of opinion were ironed out in working
groups.68 Although the Commission's budget continued to be of a
modest 1.2 million rubles (about $300,000) per year, 69 much greater
attention was paid to technical matters with a view to improving
Danubian navigation.
70
By the time the thirteenth session (December 7-15, 1955)
opened, the Danube Commission's general attitude toward the West
also underwent certain significant changes. In lieu of the usual vitu-
perative attacks on Western imperialism, the Commission's Presi-
dent referred to the greatly improved international climate follow-
ing the Geneva Conference which, in his view, showed that war was
not inevitable and that it was possible to resolve all international
problems by way of negotiations and reciprocal concessions. 71 In-
stead of depicting the Danube as a river flowing toward the East,
he spoke of it as a waterway that unites East and West. He em-
phasized that, in the realization of its fundamental task of improv-
ing navigation on the Danube, the Commission was rendering a
precious service to the cause of peace. At the same session, the
Soviet representative, in a similarly conciliatory tone, called for
increased contacts and systematic exchange of information and
documentation between the Commission and other organizations
concerned with international water transport.7 2 His words were
soon followed by deeds and, early in 1956, representatives of the
Danube Commission met with other experts in Geneva under the
auspices of the United Nations' Economic Commission for Europe
to work out a draft convention regarding a standard contract for
67 For instance, the tenth session unanimously approved the new rules for the
functioning of the various sections of the Secretariat and Services of the
Commission, whereas the eleventh session adopted rules relating to the
rights and obligations of the functionaries of these organs. X id. at 219,
315ff.; XI id. at 193, 256ff.
68 While the Commission's time was not taken up with internal political de-
bates, the Hungarian representative took time out to state that the Euro-
pean and International Commissions had never served the interests of the
riparian states but had used the Danube as an instrument of oppression
and exploitation of the Danubian peoples. Id. at 165.
61 The budgets for the years 1954, 1955 and 1956 were set at 1,194,000,
1,233,000 and 1,226,600 rubles respectively. In 1957 it was set at 3,852,000
forints and in 1961 at 4,703,614 forints (about $400,000), indicating increase
over previous figures. XI id. at 209; XII id. at 164; XIV id. at 249; XV
id. at 287; XX id. at 481.
711 Among the technical matters discussed must be mentioned the establishment
of a uniform system of marking navigable routes on the Danube, progress
of hydro-technical works, preparation of nautical maps, geophysical descrip-
tions of the Danube and its nautical conditions, establishment of uniform
rules of veterinary and phytosanitary surveillance, coordination of hydro-
meteorological services and observations, and collection of data concerning
cargo movements through the Sulina Channel. The Commission also began
consideration of the preparation of an integrated, long-term development
project - a "Grand Plan" - for the improvement of Danubian navigation.
X id. at 205ff., 238ff.; XI id. at 165, 171ff; XII id. at 132, 193; XIV id. at
235ff. Cf. note 88 infra.
71 XIII PROCES-VERBAUX 197.
72 XIII id. at 209.
73 During the same year, Commission representatives also participated in a
conference at Basel under the auspices of the Association Internationale
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the international transportation of goods on inland waterways.7 8
Shortly thereafter, at the fourteenth session (June 7-13, 1956), for
the first time an observer from the Economic Commission for
Europe was present. 4 It was at this meeting that the Yugoslav
delegate, with Moscow's full approval, went out of his way to
stress the importance of the establishment of collaboration and
contacts between the Commission and competent organs of the
United Nations.7 5 This, indeed, seemed to be a major departure
from the earlier Soviet line which, at the height of the Tito-Com-
inform quarrel, resolutely opposed contacts between the Commis-
sion and the United Nations.
76
The change in Moscow's policy was not limited to the estab-
lishment of contacts with the West, but it also encompassed the
very membership structure of the Commission. Soviet Russia no
longer intended to defer Austria's admission. On the contrary,
Moscow even held out the prospect of early West German partici-
pation. Thus, at the fifteenth session (June 5-14, 1957), some
months after the abortive Hungarian Revolution, the Hungarian
President of the Commission, in the presence of Austrian and West
German observers, echoed the Soviet view by declaring that the
time was near when both countries would occupy their seats as
full members of the Commission.
7 7
A glimpse at the reasons which were likely to have motivated
Soviet policy was given when the Commission, at its January
Permanente-des-Congres de Navigation and in a special reunion at Geneva
of the Committee on Inland Transportation of the Economic Commission
for Europe. XIV id. at 188.
74 The observer emphasized that the Economic Commission for Europe was
always ready to help in the solution of legal and technical problems arising
in the field of Danubian navigation. XIV id. at 189.
75 Id at 209.
76 In 1951, at the thirteenth session of the Economic and Social Council, the
Danube Commission was tentatively included in a list of intergovernmental
organizations that the Secretary-General had been authorized to draw up
with a view toward establishing possible relationships between these organ-
izations and the United Nations and toward possible absorption or integra-
tion of any of them into the United Nations' framework. The Soviet dele-
gate immediately objected to such an inclusion on the grounds that the
Danube Commission had been founded as a result of action by the victor-
ious nations after the Second World War and that, under Article 107 of
the United Nations' Charter, those powers alone, and not the United
Nations, were entitled to bear responsibility for it. The Western Powers,
in turn, pointed to the untenability of the Soviet interpretation under
which the United Nations would be unable to come to the aid of any state
or recognized territory created after World War II. Finally, at the fifteenth
session of the Council, the Secretary-General noted that the Danube Com-
mission had not complied with his request for information and the Council,
over Soviet objection, voted to include the Commission on the list as of
1953. Following the reversal of Soviet policy, the permanent representative
of Hungary, in a note to the United Nations dated August 27, 1959, was more
communicative and characterized the Danube Commission as an intergov-
ernmental, international organization with headquarters in Hungary. See
U.N. Doc. No. E/ECOSOC/SR.13/73 (1951) ; id. 15/676. at 20, 21 (1953) ;
U.N. Does. No. E/AC.24/SR. 73-76; Doc. E/2366, Annex II; Legislative
Texts and Treaty Provisions Concerning the Legal Status, Privileges and
Immunities of International Organizations, II U.N. Leg. Ser. 34 Doe.
ST/LEG/SER.B/11 (1961).
77 XV PROCES-VERBAUX 182.
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1958 session, took under consideration the question of linking the
Danube basin with other European waterways such as the Rhine,
Oder and Vistula.78 The immense economic significance of such a
project and the importance of securing West Germany's participa-
tion in it, which seemed likely after her admission to the Commis-
sion, was all too.obvious to be overlooked by Soviet policy-makers.7 9
Perhaps the most significant event of the new era of coopera-
tion within the Commission was the opening of the eighteenth
session (January 20-30, 1960) with Austria participating as a new
member.80 While, at the Belgrade Conference of 1948, the Western
Powers pressed hard for full Austrian participation, now the Aus-
trian move of recognizing the cbmmunist-dictated Convention was
received with considerable disappointment as almost an unfriendly
act against the West. It was felt that Austrian accession to the
Convention was not really prompted by considerations of hardship
to Austria's shipping since the latter's bilateral agreements with
the other Danubian states enabled her ships to engage in commerce
along the communist-controlled sectors of the river."' Actually,
the decision to adhere to the Danube Convention was made known
after Austrian Chancellor Raab's visit to Moscow in July 1958. He
went to great lengths to explain that his country's pledged acces-
sion was not the price that Austria had to pay for the substantial
reduction of her reparations bill to Russia.82 Austria sought to
justify her step by contending that since she contributed to the
work of the Commission through the improvement of her naviga-
tional sector and was dependent on the results, she should also
have a voice in the decisions.8 3 Apart from this and the denied
quid pro quo, it must also be borne in mind that Austria is a land-
locked country and the importance to her of the Danube as a means
of communication with the outside world cannot be overestimated.
Thus it is likely that Austria's expectation to capture a larger
share of the Danubian traffic constituted another reason for her
recognition of the Convention of 1948.84
78XVI id. at 194; 12 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 256 (Spring 1958).
79 The project has particular significance if viewed in the light of an all-water
route between the Danube and the Volga which Russia reportedly has been
planning. See Pravda, October 12, 1961, p. 2. Consult also A. Lebed, Die
Bedeutung der Wasserstrasse zwischen Ostsee und Schwarzem Meer, SOWIET
STUDIEN 96-109 (1962).
S XVIII PROCES-VERBAUX 265.
81 Haeseler, Die internationale Rechtsregelung des Donauverkehrs, 2 OSTER-
REICHISCHE OST-HEFTE 251, 254-255 (1960).
82 Under the terms of the Agreement of July 24, 1958, by which the U.S.S.R.
agreed to the reduction of Austria's reparations payments, Austria under-
took to adhere to the Danube Convention of 1948. Katzarov, Da8 Volker-
rechtliche Statut der Donau, Neue Zurcher Zeitung Dec. 12, 1959, p. 5; 188
ECONOMIST 360 (1958).
83 New York Times, January 24, 1960, p. 17.
84 The total volume of Austrian freight traffic in 1960 was 6,202,000 tons
composed of 1,189,000 tons of domestic and 5,013,000 tons of international
cargoes, the latter including 1,304,000 tons of exports, 2,975,000 tons of
imports and 734,000 tons of transit cargoes. This compares to a total of
3,112,000 tons in 1955 which was composed of 284,000 tons of domestic
and 2,828,000 tons of international cargoes. U.N. ECONOMIC COMMISSION





The sixteen years which have elapsed since the Belgrade Con-
ference indicate not only the vagaries of international politics -
as reflected in the Danube Commission's policies ranging from
Stalinist arbitrariness to what has been claimed to be "peaceful
coexistence" - but once more underline the great importance of
the Danube as a natural link between East and West. The hard
facts of economic and political geography, operating with the over-
all context of the world power process, seem to have prompted the
Soviet Union to change its policy of absolute domination and find
a conciliatory modus. vivendi with Yugoslavia within the Commis-
sion. A Danube which, during the early postwar years, was de-
pressingly free from shipping held out little benefit to the Soviet
Union. s5 The shortage of river tonnage and the growing transpor-
tation problems of the satellite countries made the use of Austrian
and German ships increasingly desirable in Danubian navigation.
Only in this way could the Soviet Union hope to utilize effectively
the economic advantages of Danube transportation and facilitate
the fulfillment of its seven-year plan. Effects of the changed Soviet
policy are already apparent from recent statistics (Tables 1 and 2).
TABLE 1
INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT ON THE DANUBE, 196086
Tonnage Classified by Origin and Destination
(in thousands of tons)
COUNTRY OF COUNTRY OF DESTINATION TOTAL
ORIGIN EXPORTS
C6z, co
U.S.S.R. - 145 404 358 627 715 1,149 - 40 3,438
Rumania 97 - 454 107 32 112 151 84 525 1,562
Bulgaria 163 1 - 36 125 6 48 6 - 385
Yugoslavia 27 1 3 - 3 10 30 341 1 416,
(Continued Next Page)
85 While no reliable statistics are available, it was estimated that Danubian
traffic in the years 1945-1947 had hardly reached one-tenth of its prewar
volume. U.N., DEP'T OF ECON. AFFAIRS, A SURVEY OF THE ECONOMIC SITUA-
TION AND PROSPECTS OF EUROPE 13 (1948).8 6 BULLETIN STATISTIQUE DE LA COMMISION DU DANUBE 40 (Budapest, 1961).
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297 1,167 683 1,224 1,601 2,975 1,138 760 10,409
TABLE 2
GOODS TRANSPORT CLASSIFIED BY PORT OF
LOADING OR UNLOADING."
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87 Id. at 5.
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1959 2,602 1,455 172 4,229


























































West Germany 1959 1,450 156 - 1,606
1960 1,508 191 - 1,699
TOTAL 1959 8,107 - - 20,393
1960 9,669 12,708 740 23,117
It will be seen that in 1960 a total of 23.1 million tons of goods,
comprised of about 12.7 million tons of domestic and 10.4 million
tons of international cargoes, were transported on the Danube.
This is an increase of almost 3 million tons over the previous year's
total, and a jump of about 14 million tons over the estimated total
for 1955. Further significant gains are expected in the years ahead.8
Likewise, it may be noted that the recent Soviet-supported
gestures of the Danube Commission in establishing contacts with
the United Nations and other international organizations do not
stem from purely altruistic motives or from a policy of genuine
liberalization. 9 Apart from the long-standing technical experience
and know-how of these organizations, a loan from the United Na-
tions would, for instance, be a valuable aid in the construction of
the proposed Oder-Morava-Danube canal, the expenses of which
would otherwise have to be primarily shared by Czechoslovakia
and Poland, the two countries which have the project most closely
at heart. Furthermore, the shifts which have taken place in the
policy of the Kremlin have not gone so far as to prevent Moscow
from retaining its control and from allowing itself sufficient lee-
way to return to its arbitrary policies should exigencies require it
in the future. While Austria has become a full-fledged member of
the Commission and eventual West German participation must be
regarded as a likely development, the increasing Western influence
will not be sufficient to offset the numerical preponderance of the
Soviet Union and its satellites. On the other hand, West Germany's
membership may be expected to operate as a further moderating
influence on the policies of the Commission and, at the same time,
is likely to be a step in the direction of strengthening trade and
possibly other contacts between the East and West. On the balance,
sixteen years after the ominous Belgrade Conference, it seems that
the Western Powers' loss of ground has been mitigated considerably
by recent developments within the Commission which hold out
some prospect for East-West European cooperation in regard to
Danubian navigation.
88After a few years delay, the Danube Commission, on the basis of data
received from the Danubian states and the Fluvial Administration of the
Lower Danube, prepared its "Grand Plan" for the first stage (1961-65)
of long-term Danube development and works which received unanimous
support just like many other technical, juridical and other reports in recent
years. XX PROCES-VERBAUX 347, 352, 353, 365. For a text of the plan, accord-
ing to national sectors of the waterway, see id. at 586. Cf. note 70 supra.
89 At the twentieth session (January 24-February 7, 1962) of the Commission,
the Hungarian representative reiterated the importance of continued extension
of the international relations of the Commission. At this meeting, in addi-
tion to observers from the Federal Republic of Germany and the Economic
Commission for Europe, other unofficial delegates were present from the
World Meteorological Organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency
and the Union des Chambres de Commerce Rhenane, a non-governmental
organization. XX PROCES-VERBAUx 337, 348.
